The paper o¤ers a novel justi…cation for the non-obviousness patentability requirement.
Introduction
To be patentable, an invention should not only be new and useful, but also su¢ ciently di¤erent that it would not have been obvious to a "Person Having Ordinary Skill In
The Art" (Witherspoon, 1980) . In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court triggered a heated debate when, in KSR vs. Tele ‡ex, it rejected the "rigid"use of the Teaching-SuggestionMotivation (TSM) test, replacing it with a "realistic"approach that strengthened the nonobviousness requirement and led the Court to invalidate the petitioner's patent (Durie and Lemley, 2008) . Following the KSR decision, the federal circuit and regional courts have strengthened the bar for non-obviousness (Nock and Gadde, 2010) . This can be seen as a response to growing concern that casual inspection of patent applications results in many trivial patents being granted, leading to costly patent litigation.
1 Lemley (2001) challenged this position, however, justifying such casual inspection as "rational ignorance."Observing that the patent value distribution is highly skewed, so that only a small proportion of patents are …nally commercialized, he argued that a careful inspection of every patent would be a waste of resources, ex post litigation providing a more cost-e¤ective screening device -pushing this logic further, even casual patent inspection is unnecessary, and the patent system should act as a registry system, as for copyrights.
This calls into question the merit of the non-obviousness requirement. In a recent survey, Denicolò (2008) distinguishes four approaches. The error cost approach regards non-obviousness as strengthening the novelty requirement, so as to reduce the probability that the Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (PTO) commits type II errors, that is, grants a patent to a technology that is already in the public domain. The option value approach 2 starts from the observation that an innovator has an incentive to implement premature ideas in order to preempt competitors; a non-obviousness requirement then helps counter-balancing such a bias. The sequential innovation approach 3 emphasizes instead the positive externalities exerted by precedent innovators; insisting on non-obviousness then helps protecting early innovators against competition from subsequent improvements. The complementary innovation approach (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998 ) builds on the "tragedy of the anticommons:"coordination failure among patent holders, as well as 1 See, e.g., Gleick (2000) , Cohen (1994) , and Thomas (2001) . 2 See, e.g., Erkal and Scotchmer (2007) . 3 See, e.g., Scotchmer (1996) , O'Donoghue (1998), and Hunt (2004) .
the risk of opportunistic behavior (hold-up) may prevent the e¢ cient use of key resources when they are subject to multiple rights -a biotech breakthrough may for instance involve dozens of complementary gene patents held by di¤erent right holders, which may prevent its development or delay its di¤usion (Shapiro, 2000) ; denying patentability to some of the components can alleviate these problems and increase the incentives to innovate (Ménière, 2008) .
Although these are relevant issues, the patent toolbox includes many instruments, such as patent length, patent breadth (lagging or leading), and so forth, 4 which appear better suited for dealing with the above problems. For example, patent breadth determines the degree to which an innovation must di¤er from an already patented one to avoid infringement, and thus when subsequent innovators must compensate previous ones; it can thus be tailored to allow for socially desirable improvements whilst protecting the value of the original innovations (Denicolo and Zanchettin, 2002) . By contrast, the nonobviousness requirement determines whether the subsequent innovations can be patented or not, and thus constitutes a less direct way of dealing with this issue.
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In this paper, we emphasize instead the role of non-obviousness as a screening device, mitigating the agency problems that plague innovators'access to …nance. As emphasized by Aghion and Tirole (1994) , while the literature often treats an innovator as a "blackbox" representing not only the owner, but also the …nancier and the developer of an innovation, in practice access to …nance is key to the development of innovation. For example, in innovative industries where start-ups and SMEs own the technologies 6 but lack the …nancial resources needed for their development and commercialization, venture capital activity is signi…cantly and positively associated with patenting rates (Kortum and Lerner, 2000) . A major challenge lies in identifying valuable technologies, and this information problem, exacerbated by adverse selection, hinders the access to …nance for those innovators who do have valuable patents. 7 Similar issues arise within …rms and groups, when deciding which projects to fund. 4 For a discussion of the patent toolbox see, e.g., Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) , Green and Scotchmer (1996), van Dijk (1996) , O'Donoghue (1998) , and Denicolo and Zanchettin (2002) . 5 See Hunt (1999) for a study of the implications of non-obviousness for sequential innovation. 6 According to Graham et al. (2010) , holding patents is a common phenomenon among start-ups and SMEs. 7 See, e.g., De Meza and Webb (1987) , Boadway and Keen (2006) , Takalo and Otto (2010), and Tereza (2007) .
Another important feature, emphasized by Kitch (1977) , is that patented technologies usually require further improvements in order to become fully operational and, because of their better knowledge of the technology, the original inventors are often essential in this process. Consequently, while the investors claim a stake in the technology, the innovators remain often involved in its development. Thus, investors not only look for valuable technologies, but also seek to cooperate with more competent innovators. The interaction between investors and innovators, however, is also often a¤ected by agency problems, as innovators have private information about their ability.
In this paper, we build on these observations and develop a framework where potential innovators vary in their productivity, which a¤ects both their ability to innovate, and to develop the innovation; an innovator must decide whether to undertake research, in which case he comes up with a technology which may be more or less promising, and requires outside …nance for its development. It is socially desirable to encourage only the good innovators, and to …nance the development of the most promising technologies. The interaction with outside investors is however a¤ected by adverse selection. In this context, non-obviousness acts as a screening device: it helps preventing ine¢ cient innovators from engaging ex ante in wasteful research activities, and contributes in this way to alleviate adverse selection problem at the …nancing stage. This comes at a cost, however, as ex post the valuable technologies that fail the requirement are no longer developed, due to the threat of imitation. We characterize the optimal non-obviousness requirement and
show that, in a simple setting where the innovator is only of two types (e¢ cient or not), it is optimal to fully discourage the ine¢ cient type from engaging in R&D: as long as the ine¢ cient type engages in research with positive probability, the ex ante bene…t from reducing further this probability dominates the ex post cost of restricting the development of marginal technologies.
The Model
A risk-neutral innovator, who must decide whether to engage in research activities, can be of two types: good ( g , with probability ) or bad ( b < g , with probability 1 ); the type is the innovator's private information, whereas the probability is common
knowledge. An innovation involves two stages, research and development. At the research stage, by incurring a private cost R the innovator randomly draws a technology x from the support [0; +1), according to a cumulative distribution F (x; ) with continuous, di¤erentiable density function f (x; ), satisfying the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP): for any x > y,
Once a technology has been drawn, its development requires a monetary cost D and, if successful, yields a pro…t x. The innovator's ability also determines the probability of success; the expected pro…t from development is thus x. For welfare analysis purposes, we follow the pioneering work of Loury (1979) and assume that the innovator appropriates the full value of the innovation; social surplus is thus also equal to x. To simplify the exposition, we normalize the interest rate to zero.
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We assume that free-riding concerns are strong enough to prevent unpatented technologies from being developed, and that every technology x is a genuine improvement of the state of art, so that there are no novelty or usefulness issues; the only concern for patentability is non-obviousness which, keeping in line with the literature, is based on the value of innovation (Denicolò, 2008) : a non-obviousness requirement P means that a technology x is patentable only when x P .
Finally, to capture agency problems we assume that the innovator is …nancially constrained and protected by limited liability. 9 An investor is thus needed to …nance the development stage; there are N 2 risk-neutral, competitive investors.
Analysis

First-Best Benchmark
We …rst consider the optimal allocation under complete information (…rst-best 
An innovator of type i should do research if and only if W i > 0. Under complete information, an unregulated market would achieve that:
Proposition 1 Under complete information and in the absence of any non-obviousness requirement, the market outcome yields the …rst-best allocation. 
Market Outcome Absent any Non-obviousness Requirement
We now consider the more realistic case in which is the innovator's private information, and …rst assume here that any innovation is patentable (P = 0).
Development
We …rst study the development stage, for a given technology x, when investors expect to face a good type g with probability v. Given the information available, without loss of generality we can restrict attention to contracts o¤ering menus of options, where each option = fT; q; g stipulates a …nancing probability q, a transfer T to the innovator, and a pro…t sharing rule ( ; 1 ) in case of successful development ( representing the innovator's share); because of the innovator's limited liability, the transfers must satisfy T 0 (in case development fails) and T + x 0 (in case it succeeds).
We refer to 0 = f0; 0; 0g as the default option (which is for instance relevant if the innovator rejects all o¤ers). Note that any "null" o¤er f0; 0; g is equivalent to 0 . We will say that in equilibrium an investor is "active"if it o¤ers an option, other than a null one, that is accepted with positive probability by at least one type of innovator.
Obviously, a technology x <x g <x b will never be developed, as this would not be pro…table even when the innovator is good. More generally, the following lemma shows that, at the development stage, the market outcome is e¢ cient: when the innovator is of type i , the innovation is developed with probability q i = q i , where
However, due to adverse selection, when x >x g both types of innovator obtain the same share~ (x; v) of the expected pro…ts x (whether the innovation is actually developed or not); the share~ (x; v) is such that, on average, investors break even:
where
0g denotes the expected pro…t from the technology, and e (v) v g + (1 v) b the expected probability of success.
Lemma 1 At the development stage, when the technology has a value x and the innovator is good ( = g ) with probability v, the market equilibrium is e¢ cient (i.e., q i = q i ) and such that:
If x <x g , there is no active investor; the innovator obtains zero pro…t.
If instead x >x g :
-at least one investor o¤ers a contract of the form i = fT i ; i ; q i g i=g;b , where
-the expected pro…t of an innovator of type is~ (x; v) x.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 1 shows that, while the market is e¢ cient at the development stage, a bad innovator obtains the same share~ of expected pro…ts as a good innovator, even if his innovation is not developed. If for instancex g < x <x b , the innovation is developed only when the innovator is good q g = 1; q b = 0 , and yet a bad innovator gets
investors must "buy" the bad innovator out of the development market. 10 More generally, whilst a good innovator obtains a higher payo¤ than a bad one, in equilibrium the former subsidizes the latter: as the share is designed so that investors break even on average, we have:
Finally, it is straightforward to check that the share~ (x; v) is continuous and increases in x and v: 11 a lower share of the pro…t needs to be left to investors when the value of the technology or the average quality of would-be developers increases.
Research
We now turn to the research stage, and consider a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where a good innovator does research with probability g whereas a bad innovator does so with probability b . A corollary of the previous Lemma is that, as he obtains a higher payo¤ at the development stage, a good innovator strictly prefers to undertake research whenever a bad one is willing to do so:
In what follows, we are interested in equilibria in which a bad innovator undertakes research with probability b = (and thus g = 1) ; the investors'posterior belief is then
and the share of pro…t can be expressed as
10 A similar buyout scheme implements the optimal allocation in the sequential innovation model of Hopenhayn et al. (2006) . Here, however, the investors, rather than subsequent innovators, must buy bad innovators out of the market, in order to …nance good ones. 11 See the end of Appendix A for a formal proof.
The expected pro…t of a bad innovator is then equal to
As v (x; ) decreases when increases, (x; ), and thus b ( ), increases in . Therefore, if b (0) < 0, a bad innovator would never do research; conversely, if b (1) > 0, both types of innovator would invest in research. To exclude these trivial situations, we assume:
It is straightforward to show that Assumption 1 implies that only a good innovator should do research if the innovator's type were publicly observed (that is,
Furthermore, under this Assumption there exists a unique threshold^ such that
which characterizes the perfect Bayesian Equilibrium:
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1:
from an e¢ ciency standpoint, the innovator should undertake research only when being good;
however, in the absence of any non-obviousness requirement, there is a unique active PBE outcome, in which the innovator does research with probability 1 when being good and with positive probability^ when being bad.
Proof. See Appendix C.
This Proposition shows that, while the market outcome is e¢ cient ex post, at the development stage, it need not be so ex ante, at the research stage: due to the limited information available to investors in the development market, good innovators subsidize bad ones; as a result, a bad innovator has excessive incentives to undertake research, and may thus do so even when it is ine¢ cient. As we will see, introducing a non-obviousness requirement helps alleviate this problem.
Non-obviousness as a Screening Device
We now study the impact of a non-obviousness requirement P . Clearly, such a requirement does not a¤ect a technology x > P ; at the development stage, the continuation equilibrium then remains as described by Lemma 1. Also, as a technology x <x g is never developed, introducing a patentability requirement P <x g does not a¤ect the PBE characterized by Proposition 2, and thus has no impact on the overall outcome. Conversely, raising the non-obviousness threshold to P >x g reduces the return that can be expected from research, as fewer technologies can be developed, and thus tends to discourage a bad innovator from undertaking research. The expected pro…t of a bad innovator becomeŝ
which decreases as P increases; as it tends towards R when P becomes in…nitely larger, the innovator will stop undertaking research for P high enough. Indeed, we have:
Proposition 3 Introducing a non-obviousness requirement P leads the bad innovator to undertake research with probability (P ), where:
(P ) =^ as long as P x g ;
(P ) = 0 whenever P x S , where the "screening" threshold x S is such that
and, for P 2 x g ; x S , (P ) is uniquely de…ned by^ b ( ; P ) = 0, and decreases from^ to 0 as P increases fromx g to x S .
Proof. See Appendix D.
Raising P abovex g involves a trade-o¤: ex post, this prevents the development of marginal technologies (those in the range [x g ; P ]), which is ine¢ cient and thus reduces welfare; but ex ante, this discourages the bad innovator from undertaking research, which enhances welfare. Obviously, it is not optimal to raise P beyond x S : as the bad innovator no longer undertakes research, raising P further then only worsens welfare, by preventing the development of additional technologies. Conversely, some screening is optimal: starting from P =x g , a slight increase in P involves only a second-order loss of e¢ ciency (as the marginal technologies, for which x is close tox g , generate only a negligible welfare), but yields a …rst-order bene…t by discouraging the bad innovator (as @ =@P < 0 for P =x g ). The optimal non-obviousness requirement thus lies in the range (
The M LRP property (1) actually ensures that, as long as x < x S , the bene…t from discouraging the bad innovator from undertaking research dominates the cost of preventing marginal technologies from being developed; hence it is socially optimal to deter fully the bad innovator from undertaking research:
Proposition 4 The socially optimal non-obviousness requirement is P = x S .
Proof. See Appendix E.
Proposition 4 shows that it is optimal to raise the non-obviousness requirement so as to keep the bad innovator entirely out of the market. It is worth noting that the market cannot achieve this outcome on its own. Suppose for instance that the investors announce that they will not …nance any technology x < x S . If it were credible, such a self-regulation would su¢ ce to keep the bad innovator out the market (i.e., = 0). Unfortunately, there is a dynamic inconsistency problem: at the development stage, the investors would then have an incentive to …nance the development of any technology x > x g ; but anticipating this, a bad innovator would therefore undertake research. Thus, a regulatory intervention is needed to enforce the threshold P = x S .
Discussion
Policy Implications
An immediate policy implication of our analysis is that there is a bene…t from maintaining an e¤ective non-obviousness requirement (Meurer and Strandburg, 2008) , rather than downgrading the patent system to a copyright system -to be sure, this bene…t should be compared with the actual cost of enforcing this requirement.
Several empirical studies highlight problems generated by weak patents. into that direction.
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Our analysis also highlights some determinants of the optimal non-obviousness threshold, P = x S ; from (6), we have @P @ = 0 and:
leading to:
Proposition 5 The socially optimal non-obviousness policy P decreases as the research cost R or the development cost D increases; it does not depend on the proportion of good innovators.
As the objective is to discourage bad innovators, there is less of a need for raising the non-obviousness threshold when research and development costs are important. In the same vein, application fees, which in ‡ate these costs, can also contribute to deter bad innovators. This is in line with Mitchell and Zhang (2012) and Schuett (2012) . Greater …nancial market frictions, which tend to increase the development cost D, 14 also lead to weaken the non-obviousness requirement. Conversely, policies aiming at subsidizing research activities should lead to a stricter non-obviousness requirement.
Robustness Checks
In this subsection, we present several extensions to discuss the robustness of our insights.
Development Managers
We assumed so far that the innovator had to be involved in the development of the technology. Suppose instead that there is a competitive market of risk-neutral development managers, who can develop the technology with a (publicly known) success rate m . Obviously, delegation will never occur if m < b . If instead m > g , both types of innovator will delegate the development to a manager; the technology will thus developed whenever
x >x m D m and, the success rate m being common knowledge, the innovator will obtain the associated pro…t, m x D. As the innovator appropriates the welfare he creates, there is no need for government intervention: the innovator will undertake research when it is e¢ cient to do so, as in the complete information case.
We now focus on the more interesting case where
For the sake of exposition, we moreover suppose here that investors do not observe whether a manager is hired or not (we discuss the case where delegation is observable in Web Appendix B.2), in which case a bad innovator will always delegate the development to a manager. Adapting lemma 1 accordingly, when P x g the expected pro…t of a bad innovator becomes
It follows that, if~
), then in the absence of a non-obviousness requirement the bad innovator would undertake research with positive probability. Our analysis carries over, however: it is optimal to introduce a non-obviousness requirement that is su¢ ciently stringent to keep the bad innovator out of the market:
). The socially optimal nonobviousness requirement is then P =x S , such that~ b 0;x S = 0.
Proof. See Web Appendix B.1.
Collateral
Suppose the innovator has some private asset A < D, so that, at the development stage, investors can require any collateral C A. Increasing the collateral level mitigates the adverse selection problem, and leads to a reduction in the subsidy to the bad innovator.
Adapting the proof of Lemma 1, we have:
Lemma 2 At the development stage, the investors ask for maximal collateral (i.e., C = A) and the equilibrium is e¢ cient (i.e., when the innovator is of type i , then the technology is developed if x >x i ); in addition: if x <x g , the innovator obtains zero pro…t;
the incentive constraints are not binding; a good innovator obtains the full value from the technology, 
This Lemma con…rms that the use of a collateral mitigates the adverse selection problem that a¤ects the …nancing of development, in line with the established literature -see, e.g., Martin (2009) . When the technology is only marginally pro…table (x <x), the bad innovator is no longer subsidized; more generally, the net payo¤ of a bad innovator decreases (i.e., the subsidy is reduced) as the collateral A increases: for x >x, using c e x = e + A, this payo¤ can be expressed as
15 For instance, the following options support an equilibrium, in which the incentive constraints are not binding:
, and q b = 0; T b = A . To see that
x (A) <x b , it su¢ ces to note that, for x =x b (and A < D), a bad innovator obtains a positive payo¤ by mimicking a good type:
which thus decreases as A increases (conversely, the net payo¤ of a good innovator increases with A).
It remains optimal to keep the bad innovator out of the market. However, as the use of collateral now limits cross-subsidization at the development stage, this can be achieved with a less stringent requirement:
Proposition 7 The optimal threshold P , which discourages the bad innovator from undertaking research, decreases as the collateral A increases.
Proof. See Web Appendix C.
Pure Signaling
The analysis also carries over to the case where the "non-obviousness" characteristic x does not a¤ect the value of the innovation, as long as it provides a signal about the innovator's type. Suppose for instance that the expected pro…t from developing the technology only depends on the innovator's type, : it is equal to D,
the variable x only represents the degree of non-obviousness, and still satis…es the M RLP
property. The equilibrium share of the innovator is now given by
Going through the same steps as in our original framework, it can be shown that it is still optimal to set P = x S , where the threshold x S , designed to keep the bad innovator out of the market, is now de…ned by
Multiple Types
The analysis can be extended to any number n of types: 2 = f 1 ; :::; n g, where 1 < ::: < n ; let denote the probability distribution by f 1 ; :::; n g and the viability thresholds byx i = D= i -that is, it is e¢ cient to develop the technology (q i = 1) if
x >x i , and not to develop it (q i = 0) if x <x i .
As before, any type j > i undertakes research with probability 1 whenever type i is willing to do so; the "active" types thus constitute a subset of the form k = f k ; k+1 ; :::; n g. If the marginal type k undertakes research with probability , then at the development stage the probability distribution becomes v = v k ; :::; v n , such that:
The expected type, for a given x, is then e ( ) = P n i=k v i ( ) i . Adapting the proof of Lemma 1 yields:
Lemma 3 The development stage is e¢ cient (i.e., q i = q i for every type i that undertakes research) and such that:
If x >x k , investors o¤er a pooling contract:
If x <x
n , no active contract is o¤ered.
Forx n < x <x k , investors o¤er:
where is designed so that investors break even:
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1. The only di¤erence is the "buy out" equilibrium whenx n < x <x k . The investors need to give a share of the expected pro…t
x to all types of innovator, even when the technology is not developed. For the innovator with the lowest ability, this can be achieved through a …xed payment. For the other innovators whose technology should not developed (the innovators i 2 fk + 1; :::{g, say), it is not possible to rely on a …xed payment, as this would not be incentive compatible:
all the "bad types" i <{ would pick the larger transfer T{ = { x designed for { . The solution consists in approximating a …xed payment with a sharing contract that entails a negligible probability of development, together with a high payo¤ in case of successful development (see footnote 16).
16 When q i = 1, the share is thus ; when instead q i = 0, the contract "q i = 0; i q i = " should be interpreted as the limit of "q i = 1 N ; i = N " for N ! +1. Alternatively, if feasibility reasons constrain …nancing probabilities to be multiples of some ", then there exists an ""-e¢ cient" equilibrium where, for i and x such that x <x i , q i = " and i = =".
As in our baseline model, at the development stage "bad innovators" are subsidized by good ones. As a result, bad innovators have excessive incentives to undertake research, and it is optimal to introduce a non-obviousness to keep the worst types of innovator out of the market. It may however be optimal to engage in partial screening. To see this, we now consider a three-type scenario where = f ;^ ; g, with a probability distribution = f ;^ ; g. Obviously, there is no need for screening when W > 0 or W < 0.
Furthermore, whenŴ > 0, the only issue is to discourage the worst type, and the previous analysis shows that it is then optimal to fully keep him out of the market. To focus on the most novel case, we introduce the following assumption:
Under Assumption 2, both partial screening and full screening can take place:
Proposition 8 Under assumption 2:
In the absence of any non-obviousness requirement, the market outcome is such that the worst type of innovator ( ) does research with probability , whereas the other two (^ and ) do research with probability 1.
It is optimal to introduce a non-obviousness requirement that keeps the worst type out of the market; depending on the probability distribution of the other types, it may be optimal to keep the middle type out or in the market.
Proof. See Web Appendix D.
The Proposition …rst con…rms that it is optimal to raise the non-obviousness threshold so as to keep the worst type of innovator out of the market. That is, P P , where the threshold P is such that the worst type does not do research, whereas the other two types undertake research with probability 1. Consider now raising the threshold beyond P . At …rst, this has no impact on the research decisions (both^ and still undertake research with probability 1), and thus reduces welfare, by preventing some technologies from being developed. It is only when it reaches a certain levelP > P that the non-obviousness starts discouraging the middle type^ -and in this range the previous analysis shows that it is optimal to set the bar high enough (to some level P >P ) to keep the middle type out of the market. There are thus two possible candidate for the optimal non-obviousness: full screening (i.e., P = P ), which keeps both ine¢ cient types ( and^ ) out of the market, or partial screening (i.e., P =P ), which keeps the worst type out of the market but lets the middle type^ undertake research. It is straightforward to check that partial screening is optimal when the middle type arises with low probability (that is, when^ is small), as keeping this type out of the market cannot o¤set in that case the cost of preventing the development of technologies x 2 P ; P . Conversely, full screening is optimal when the best type is unlikely (that is, when is small).
Patent Fees
As noted above, introducing a patent fee F provides an alternative way for screening out the bad innovator as, if a technology cannot be developed in the absence of patent protection, the research cost then becomes D + F . In the absence of any non-obviousness requirement, screening out the bad innovator requires a fee F high enough to leave no pro…t from research to a bad innovator, even if investors anticipate that only a good innovator does research:
By contrast, relying on non-obviousness requires a threshold P = x S , such that^
Comparing these two conditions yields
As the integrand is lower in the LHS than in the RHS, it follows that
That is, fewer marginal innovation are excluded when relying on a patent fee than on non-obviousness. With non-obviousness, the welfare achieved is
whereas with a patent fee it is equal to:
where denotes the shadow cost of public funds. As there is less exclusion in the patent fee regime (i.e., these two instruments should however also account for the cost of enforcing the nonobviousness requirement. Designing an optimal framework that incorporate both of these two instruments constitutes an interesting avenue of research.
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Concluding Remarks
The rationale of the non-obviousness patentability requirement is controversial and its role is debated. After all, why should the society preclude trivial but genuine innovations from being patented? Is it a good idea to add to the burden of PTOs, by imposing an additional check on patent applications? In this paper, we propose a justi…cation for such a non-obviousness requirement. If innovators have private information about their ability to do research, and develop the resulting technologies, the existence of ine¢ cient innovators exert negative externalities on good ones. In such a context, by excluding trivial patents a non-obviousness requirement acts as an e¤ective screening instrument.
Anticipating that their innovation will be less likely to be patentable, weak innovators will refrain to engage in R&D, which mitigates adverse selection problems for the development of good innovators'R&D projects.
In the recent years we have seen a trend towards lower patentability requirements.
For example, software, which used to fall under copyright protection, has become eligible for patent protection. So are database and business methods, which are now patentable in some countries, including the U.S., Japan and South Korea. One of the bene…ts of 17 The applications of an innovation can vary in scale as well as in value. If the scale does not depend on the innovator's type, and patent fees cannot tailored according to that scale, then non-obviousness may be more e¤ective in targeting the patents that are more likely to be generated by weak innovators.
lowering the patentability requirements is to reduce the examination costs, as PTOs can now examine the applications more casually than before. And while many commentators contend that this merely transfers the burden onto the judicial system, as suggested by the recent surge of patenting and litigation, Lemley (2001) points out that this may still be cost-e¤ective, as only few patents develop a commercial value.
This paper shows however that lowering the patentability requirements may harm social welfare, by exacerbating adverse selection in the access to …nance. For instance, many start-ups, lacking the …nancial resources needed to develop their technologies, rely on the number and quality of their patents for attracting investors. This gives investors useful information about innovators' abilities, an important element for the successful development of their inventions. However, when patentability requirements are weakened, ine¢ cient innovators can enter the market and mimic more e¢ cient ones, making it harder for investors to identify good projects, and harder for good innovators to get …nanced.
A Proof of Lemma 1
We characterize here the equilibria described in Lemma 1. For the sake of exposition, we will restrict attention to equilibria in which the investors adopt pure strategies (each type of innovator can however randomize over several o¤ers).
Letx i denote the break-even threshold for the i innovator, de…ned by ixi = D. If x <x g , no active contract can be o¤ered to any type (q b = q g = 0), as at least one party would get a negative expected pro…t. From now on, we thus focus on the case x >x g .
Since all parties are risk-neutral, they only care about expected revenues; therefore, there is no scope for stochastic payments or transfers. To facilitate our analysis, we introduce the following notation: for each investor n 2 f1; 2; :::; N g, J n = fj 1 ; :::; j Kn g denotes the set of options o¤ered by investor n. i n;j k denotes the probability that a i innovator accepts the option j k o¤ered by investor n.
i n = P j k 2Jn i n;j k denotes the probability that a i innovator accepts one of the options o¤ered by investor n. i n;j k denotes the pro…t that option j k yields for investor n when accepted by a i innovator.
In addition, we introduce the following notation for the equilibrium outcome:
~ n denotes the expected pro…t of investor n. ~ i denotes the expected pro…t that~ i yields for a i innovator.
Lemma 4 In equilibrium, each investor n 2 f1; 2; :::; N g obtains~ n =~ .
Proof. By construction, for each investor n 2 f1; 2; :::; N g:
Therefore,
18 Therefore, the above inequality
It follows that, for each n 2 f1; 2; :::; N g:
where the last inequality stems from the fact that, by construction,~ m 0 for any m 2 f1; 2; :::; N g.
Assume now that~ n <~ , and suppose that investor n deviates and o¤ers f^ g ;^ b g,
is incentive compatible, and thus so is f^ g ;^ b g. Moreover, f^ g ;^ b g will be accepted with probability 1, as it gives both types of innovator a strictly higher pro…t than all other o¤ers. Hence, deviating in this way gives investor n a pro…t~ " >~ n , a contradiction.
Therefore, in equilibrium, all investors obtain an expected pro…t equal to~ .
Lemma 5 In equilibrium,~ = 0.
Proof. As~ n =~ from Lemma 4, condition (7) This break-even result for the competitive equilibrium outcome is in line with Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997) . In Web Appendix A, we show that the equilibrium contracts must satisfy:q g = 1,T g = 0,q b = q b , and
The equilibrium share~ g is then determined by the break-even condition 19 of the investors. More precisely:
Case 1:x g < x <x b (buyout). In that case,q b = 0;~ b is thus irrelevant, and
the investors "buy"the bad innovator out of the market. The investors' break-even condition then yields
Case 2: x >x b (pooling). In that case, both types of innovator are …nanced:
The investors'break-even condition then yields parallels the break-even line for a good innovator.
Note that, in both cases, the good type subsidizes the bad one; this is obvious when x <x b , since a bad innovator then obtainsT b > 0 even though his innovation does not get developed, and still holds when x >x b , as 
But then, since the equilibrium options
o¤ering more than~ i to at least one type i will result in a loss, since in equilibrium the investors barely break even.
We conclude with the properties of~ . The continuity stems directly from the de…nition given by (4). As for the comparative statics:
where in the last expression, the numerator increases with x and the denominator decreases as v increases.
, where e (v) x increases with x and v.
B Proof of Corollary 1
Suppose that a bad innovator undertakes research with positive probability; then, for a given technology x, he gets …nanced with probability q b (x) and, whenever x >x g , receives an expected payment equal to~ (x; v) i x; the expected pro…t from undertaking research is thus
where t (x) ~ (x; v) x is positive and increases with x:
A good innovator would obtain instead an expected pro…t equal to
The di¤erence between these two expected pro…ts can be expressed as:
where the strict inequality stems from g > b and t (x) > 0, while the last inequality follows from t 0 (x) > 0 and …rst-order stochastic dominance.
C Proof of Proposition 2
Assumption 1 implies:
where the last inequality stems from b < g , g x D increasing in x and M LRP .
It follows that a good innovator should undertake research:
where the weak inequality stems from the bad innovator being subsidized by the good one at the development stage (see (8)). It follows that a bad innovator should not undertake research:
We now consider the market equilibrium. Let g (resp., b ) denote the probability that the innovator undertakes research when being good (resp., being bad).
Suppose …rst that g < 1. Corollary 1 implies b = 0; but then, under Assumption 1 a bad innovator would have an incentive to deviate and undertake research, a contradiction.
Therefore, g = 1.
In the same vein, if b <^ then a bad innovator would have an incentive to undertake research with probability 1, a contradiction; conversely, if b >^ then a bad innovator would have an incentive to undertake research with probability 0, a contradiction. Therefore, the only candidate equilibrium is such that b =^ ; conversely, g = 1; b =^ constitutes indeed an equilibrium, as the bad innovator is then indi¤erent between doing research or not -and thus, from Corollary 1, the good innovator is willing to undertake research.
D Proof of Proposition 3
As already noted, setting P x g has no impact on the development stage: as in the baseline scenario (i.e., as for P = 0), only those technologies such that x >x g are developed with positive probability and yield a positive pro…t to the innovator. For P > x g , the expected pro…t of a bad innovator becomeŝ
exists a unique threshold x S >x g satisfying^ b (0; x S ) = 0, or (6). Furthermore, in the rangex g < P < x S , we have:
As^ b ( ; P ) decreases as increases, it follows that there exists a unique (P ) such that^ b ( ; P ) = 0. Furthermore, by construction we have (x g ) =^ , x S = 0, and, in the range P 2 x g ; x S , the implicit function theorem yields
The end of the proof follows the same step as for Proposition 2: for > , a bad innovator would rather not undertake research, whereas for < , a bad innovator would derive a positive expected pro…t from undertaking research. Conversely, when = , b = 0 implies that a bad innovator is indi¤erent between undertaking research or not, and a good innovator is thus willing to undertake research.
E Proof of Proposition 4
By construction, in the equilibria characterized by Proposition 3, a bad innovator and the investors obtain zero pro…ts; therefore, social welfare coincides with the expected net pro…t of a good innovator
For P < x S , di¤erentiating this expression with respect to P leads to
Using (9), this can be expressed as:
From the M LRP property,
for any x > P ; as @ @ < 0, and d dP < 0 as long asx g < P < x S , it follows thatŴ (P ) strictly increases with P in that range.
By contrast, for P > x S , (P ) = 0 and thus
The socially optimal threshold is thus P = x S .
Web Appendix: Supplemental Materials
A Characterization of the Equilibrium Contracts
In this section, we provide a characterization of the equilibrium contracts, which is used in the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. We …rst show that the options~ g and~ b are e¢ cient (i.e.,q i = q i for i = g; b);
by construction, they satisfy:
the incentive compatibility constraints:
and the participation constraints:
Now, supposeq i 6 = q i for some i 2 fg; bg, and consider the following deviant o¤ers:
where " and satisfy
The options^ g and^ b are such that:
They meet the limited liability conditions:
where the last expression is non-negative:
-this is obvious if~ g 0, as then all terms are non-negative; They moreover strictly satisfy the IC constraints:
where the …rst inequality stems from g x > " and the second one from (10), and:
where the …rst inequality stems from " > b x, the second one from (11), and the third one fromT g 0 and b < g .
And they attract both types of innovator with probability 1:
To conclude the argument, it su¢ ces to show that these options can bring a positive expected payo¤ to the deviant investor. This expected payo¤ can be expressed aŝ
x D and the above expressions:
As~ = 0 from Lemma 5 andq i 6 = q i for some i 2 fg; bg, this expected payo¤ is positive for "; small enough.
Lemma 7 There is cross-subsidization:
We now rule out the latter case.
Consider …rst the case x >x b , whereq g =q b = 1 from Lemma 6. Hence, if~
But the incentive compatibility condition (11) implies (usingq g =q b = 1):
Therefore, we have~
and thus~ 
Corollary 2 All o¤ers made and accepted in equilibrium are e¢ cient (i.e., such that q i = q i ); in addition, both types of investors obtain a positive payo¤ and thus choose an option with probability 1, and all o¤ers made and accepted by a innovator of type i are equivalent to~ i , for both the investor and that type of innovator.
Proof. We …rst show that each type of innovator i chooses an option with total probability 1 (and obtains the same payo¤~ i > 0 with all the options selected). To see this,
therefore, a bad innovator will indeed choose an option with probability 1, and obtain the same positive payo¤~ b on all options selected. As for a good innovator, note that the incentive compatibility condition yields
If instead q b = 1 and~ b 6 = 0, then:
-If instead~ b < 0, the conclusion follows fromT
where the last inequality stems from limited liability.
We thus have
, and:
However, we also have
Subtracting these two equalities yields
and thus, as q i q i n;j k i x D 0, q i n;j k = q i for every type i = g; b, every investor n = 1; :::; N , and any option j n selected with positive probability by i .
To conclude the argument, it su¢ ces to note that, by construction, each o¤er accepted by i must give the same payo¤~ i to that type of innovator; but as the o¤er must moreover be e¢ cient, if also gives the same payo¤~
Proof. Suppose thatT g > 0, and consider the following deviant o¤ers:
where " and satisfy 0 < " < ( g b )q g x. These options are such that:
where the inequality stems from (11). Therefore, the option^ g attracts the good innovator with probability 1 and, using Lemma 7 and^
for "; small enough we have:
As^ g >~ g , the option^ g attracts the good innovator with probability 1; therefore, if the deviating investor also attracts the bad innovator with probability p, his expected payo¤ is^
which is positive:
if instead^ b < 0, this follows from
The deviation is therefore pro…table, contradicting the assumptionT g > 0. To conclude the argument, it su¢ ces to note that~ g > 0 (see proof of Corollary 2) then implies
Proof. From Lemmas 6 and 8, the IC constraints are:
Suppose now thatT
and consider the following deviant
where " and satisfy 0 < " < ( g b )x. These options are such that:
They meet the limited liability conditions, asT g =^ b = 0,^ g >~ g > 0, and
They strictly satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints:
where the inequality stems from ( g b )x > " and g > b , and:
Finally, we have^
where the …rst term is positive by assumption. Therefore, using Lemma 7 and
The deviation is therefore pro…table, contradicting the assumptionT
We now complete the characterization of the candidate competitive equilibria. From
Lemmas 6, 8 and 9, the equilibrium contracts must satisfy:q g = 1,T g = 0,q b = q b , and
The equilibrium share~ g is then determined by the break-even condition 20 of the investors.
B Development Managers
In this section, we …rst prove Proposition , before discussing the case where investors can observe whether the development is delegated to a manager.
B.1 Proof of Proposition 6
The proof follows the same steps as for Proposition 4. Social welfare coincides again with the expected net pro…t of a good innovator:
where~ (P ) is such that
Substituting 16 into the …rst-order condition
leads to the same conclusion as before:
20 See Lemma 5.
For P > x S , (P ) = 0 and thus
It follows that it is still optimal to keep the bad innovator out of the market, by setting P =x S .
B.2 Observable Delegation
We discuss here the case where investors can observe whether the innovator delegates or not the development to a manager. A bad innovator then faces a trade-o¤: hiring a manager generates an e¢ ciency gain but eliminates the rent from private information.
Preserving the information rent yields (x; ) b x, whereas hiring a manager yields m x D; in addition, in an equilibrium in which a bad innovator delegates with probability 1, investors o¤er a share g (x) = 1
to the innovator if he does not delegate. Therefore: If x > x > x, the bad innovator delegates the development with probability p, in such a way that^ (x; ; p)
The pro…t of a bad innovator, for a given nonobviousness level P , is therefore of the form:
We are interested in the case where the bad innovator should not undertake research: 21 We have:
It follows that the optimal non-obviousness requirement never exceeds x, as for P > x (>x m ), the expected pro…t of a bad innovator is negative:
More generally, it is not optimal to raise P beyond the threshold, x S , for which the bad innovator is discouraged from undertaking research (that is, such that
Conversely, for P 2 x g ; x S , the bad innovator undertakes research with probability
Total welfare then coincides again with the pro…t of a good innovator:
The …rst-order condition thus becomes
It it therefore again optimal to keep the bad innovator out of the market.
22 For x < x ( ), the innovator obtains as before a share of pro…t equal to (x; ); for x 2 [x; x], the share^ satis…es^ b x = m x D, and thus a good innovator obtains an expected pro…t equal tô
The computation uses the fact that the expected pro…t of a good innovator is continuous at x = x ( ).
C Proof of Proposition 7
The expected pro…t of a bad innovator is equal to^ C ( ;x (A)) as long as P x (A), and to^ C ( ; P ) for P >x (A), wherê
where^ C (x; ) C (x; v (x; )). Assuming that^ C (0;x (A)) > 0 >^ C (0;x (A)), there exists x C (A) such that the bad innovator does not do research when P > x C (A), and undertakes instead research with probability C (P ) as long as x < x c , where C (P ) is such that^ C C ; P = 0 and decreases with P in the range P 2 x (A) ; x C : di¤erentiatinĝ C C ; P = 0 yields
Social welfare coincides with the expected net pro…t of a good innovator:
which, using (17), can be expressed as:
The M LRP property thus implies again thatŴ C (P ) strictly increases with P as long as P < x C (A). If follows that it is optimal to set P = x C (A), so as to keep the bad innovator out of the market. The socially optimal threshold is thus P = x C (A).
Finally, to show that x C (A) decreases as A increases, it su¢ ces to note that x C (A)
is characterized by:
Di¤erentiating this equality then yields
where the inequality stems from 
D Proof of Proposition 8
If the worst type undertakes research with positive probability, then both other types do research with probability 1. If instead the worst type does not undertake research, and consider the middle type's research decision. If he does research, then at the development stage he will be subsidized by the best type and thus obtain more than max n^ x D; 0 o ; therefore, in the absence of any non-obviousness requirement, he will obtain more than W > 0. It follows that the middle type will undertake research with probability 1, and thus the best type will also do so. Therefore, in the absence of non-obviousness, the worst type undertakes research with some probability and the other two types do research with probability 1. f (x; ) +^ f (^ ; x) + f ( ; x) :
When introducing P > x D , the equilibrium probability (P ) is by de…ned by As long as P < P , which is de…ned by (0; P ) = 0, the social welfare can be expressed as the sum of the expected payo¤s of the types^ and :
W (P ) = +1 Z P (x; (P )) xy (x) dx; where y(x) =^ ^ f (^ ; x) + f ( ; x):
Hence:
dW (P ) dP = (P; (P ))P y(P ) + d dP .
It follows that it is optimal to fully screen out , by raising P to at least P . Note that for P = P , the worst type is still indi¤erent between doing research or not (and in equilibrium, he chooses not to undertake research), implying that the middle type does research with probability 1. This remains the case as long as P <P , de…ned bŷ (1;P ) = 0, where^ ^ ; P denotes the expected pro…t of the middle type when it undertakes research with probability^ (and does not do research, whereas does so with probability 1) and is equal tô In the range h P ;P i , increasing P only leads to prevent the development of technologies x 2 [P ; P ], and thus reduces welfare. However, raising P beyondP discourages the middle type. In this range, the analysis is similar as in the two-type case, and it is optimal to set P = P , de…ned by^ 0; P = 0.
It follows that the optimal non-obviousness requirement is either P or P . The associated welfare levels are:
Partial screening (i.e., P = P ) is socially optimal when^ ! 0, as P > P implies whereas W ( P ) > 0, as it corresponds to the expected pro…t of the best type (and that type prefers to do research when the middle type^ is indi¤erent between doing research or not); it is therefore optimal to have full screening (i.e., P = P ), as W (P ) < 0 < W ( P ).
